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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that cultural and discursive attitudes towards miscarriage, stillbirth
and abortion attribute maternal blame to these losses and silence the expression of
grief over them. It further argues that, following pregnancy loss, this silence and
blame, coupled with the veneration and discursive production of motherhood as a
woman's biological and psychical destiny, produce 'symptoms' that, according to
Freud, are a sign of a pathological melancholia. I suggest, however, that these
symptoms - self-reproach and impoverishment of the ego as responses to pregnancy
loss, do not necessarily indicate a woman's pathological failure to resolve loss but
reflect the social context in which pregnancy loss occurs and the discursive
production of miscarriage, stillbirth, abortion and motherhood.
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I

Introduction

Sue Gillett (1998, n.p.) has written that "in our technologically advanced society
where infant survival is the expectation and the norm, the mother who fails to deliver
a living child is an anomaly, even a threat to the coherence of our social and symbolic
orders". She asks "Where is [this mother] in relation to life? What does she do to
language, to meaning, to thought?" Rather than offer a response, I would like to
appropriate her questions and ask, instead, How do our social and symbolic orders
threaten her? What do language, meaning, thought do to her? Indeed, how does
discourse contribute to this mother's grief at the loss of a child, induce ego losses and
affect her conception of self after the specific losses of miscarriage, stillbirth and
abortion?

Freud argues in Mourning and Melancholia (191711984, p. 252), that these two
conditions are "regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of
some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's country, liberty, an
ideal and so on". For Freud, both are characterised by "a profoundly painful
dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, [and]
inhibition of all activity" (1917 /1984, p.252). He distinguishes melancholia from
mourning, however, in stating that the former manifests in the individual as:
an extraordinary diminution in his self-regard, an
impoverishment of his ego on a grand scale. In mourning it
is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia
it is the ego itself. The patient represents his ego to us as
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worthless, incapable of any achievement and morally despicable;
he reproaches himself and expects to be cast out and punished
(191711984, p. 254).
Freud accounts for this disturbance of self-regard by arguing that the patient's selfaccusations are really "reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted
away from it in to the patient's own ego" (1917/1984, pp. 257-258). He elaborates
this point by explaining that, under 'normal' circumstances "a real slight or
disappointment" from the loved person shatters the object-relationship with that
person and, as a consequence, the libido is withdrawn from the object of love and
invested in a new object. The melancholic's libido, however, does not invest in a new
object, withdrawing, instead, into the melancholic's own ego. This withdrawal of the
libido into the ego then serves "to establish an identification of the ego with the
abandoned object", wherein the ego can now be judged and reproached "by a special
agency" (a point I shall return to) as if it were the lost object. He concludes that the
result of this abnormal withdrawal of the libido into the ego is the transformation of
an object-loss into an ego-loss.

Theorists such as Judith Butler have, however, pointed to Freud's later revision of his
theories of melancholia. She remarks that in "Mourning and Melancholia", Freud's
standpoint is that the resolution of grief is achieved by breaking the attachment, or
cathexis, to the lost object and by the formation of other attachments to new objects.
She points out, however, that later, in "The Ego and The ld", Freud "makes room for
the notion that melancholic identification may be a prerequisite for letting the object
go" and that these melancholic identifications thus come to constitute the ego itself
(Butler, 1997/2004, p. 246).
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This reformulation of "melancholia [as] a precondition for both the [formation of the]
ego and the work of mourning" (Eng & Kazanjian, 2003, p. 4) calls into question
Freud's earlier assertion that impoverishment of the ego and self-reproach after loss
are symptomatic of the melancholic's "pathological disposition" (Freud, 1917/1984,
p. 252). It would seem that this impoverishment of the ego and loss of self-regard
must be aetiological, rather than symptomatic features of mourning itself. That is, any
loss firstly precipitates a change in one's conception of self and a redefinition of the
self in relation to the world, and that this, in tum, results in a mourning for a lost self
alongside, but distinguishable from, mourning for any object loss, ideal loss and so
on. As Kristeva (1989, p. 5) puts it "any loss entails the loss of my being".

Freud himself gestured toward this notion of the loss of self in "Mourning and
Melancholia" in asking "whether a loss in the ego irrespectively of the object- a
purely narcissistic blow to the ego - may not suffice to produce the picture of
melancholia" (Freud, 1917/1984, p. 262). He does not, however, explore this
supposition further. To do so throws into doubt his assertions that the symptoms of
melancholia, self-reproach and an impoverished ego, reflect a grief that has slipped
into pathology. Instead, his question opens the way to understand these symptoms as
not simply abnormal responses to the loss of a loved object, but as responses to a
"narcissistic blow", a wound to the ego that has resulted from something other than
an ongoing attachment to, and incorporation of, the lost object.
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In "Mourning and Melancholia" Freud (1917/1984, p. 260) argues that the ego

incorporates the lost object as a narcissistic identification with it in order to deny that
loss, and that the self-abasement of the ego is really directed against that lost object.
He further asserts that this occurs when "one part of the ego sets itself over against
the other, judges it critically, and, as it were, takes it as its object" (Freud, 1917/1984,
p. 256). He deems this critical part of the ego "the agency commonly called
'conscience"' (Freud, 1917/1984, p. 256). This form of agency makes its appearance
too, in his "On Narcissism"(1913/1999), where he surmises that this agency, or
conscience, constantly watches the ego to ensure that the ego measures up to the
demands of the ego-ideal. According to Freud (1913/1999, pp. 151-153), the
formation of the ego-ideal comes about when the developing subject's infantile
narcissism, or self-love, comes into conflict with the "cultural and ethical ideas" and
the standards set by his parents and his or her society. In order to conform to these
ideas, the subject must give up this self-love, substituting it with the ego-ideal which
now becomes "the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the
actual ego". The implication here is that, through those parental and societal
criticisms that inscribe certain cultural and ethical ideas, the infantile ego finds itself
to be lacking and substitutes the ideal ego as its object of love. This formulation of
the ego-ideal as an object of love that is already incorporated within the self, that
embodies a set of standards with which the self strives to fulfil and identify, raises
certain questions in regard to Freud's discussion of mourning and melancholia. If the
ego-ideal can be an object of love, as Freud suggests, what happens when one fails to
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meet its standards? Can this ideal be lost to the self and, if so, might this loss be an
example of a "purely narcissistic blow"?

In commenting on Freud's work on narcissism and the formation of the ego, Kristeva
(1983/1989, p. 252) argues that:
The subject only exists inasmuch as it identifies with an ideal other
who is the speaking other ... a symbolic formation beyond the mirror
[Lacan's mirror of self-recognition], who is indeed the size of a Master,
is a magnet for identification because he is neither an object of need nor
one of desire. The Ego Ideal includes the Ego on account of the love that this
Ego has for it and thus unifies it, restrains its drives, turns it into a Subject.

Here, Kristeva, like Freud, stresses that the ego strives to identify with the ego-ideal,
but she goes further in suggesting that entry into the symbolic order and the
attainment of subjectivity depends on the identification with this ideal. By implication
then, a failure to successfully identify with this ideal leads to the inability to attain, or
the loss of, subjectivity.

Similarly, in her work on gender acquisition, Judith Butler addresses the notion that
identification with an ideal is imperative to the subject's entry into the symbolic
order. She asks, "Is there a way in which gender identifications or, rather the
identifications that become central to the formation of gender, are reproduced through
melancholic identification?" (1997/2004, p. 247).This question is crucial to my work
here, as Butler extends the notion of melancholic identification as imperative in the
attainment of subjectivity to emphasise its importance in the attainment of, and
identification with, normative gender attributes and roles. Butler understands
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'melancholic identification' as an effect of the child's acquisition of gendered identity
as propounded by Freudian theory. She writes:
the positions of 'masculine' and 'feminine', which Freud ... understood
as the effects of laborious and uncertain accomplishment, are
established in part through prohibitions which demand the loss of
certain sexual attachments ....the little girl becomes a girl through
being subject to a prohibition which bars the mother as an object of
desire and installs that barred object as part of the ego, indeed, as a
melancholic identification (Butler, 1997/2004, pp. 247-248).
Here, Butler asserts that the prohibitions against incestuous and homosexual desire
force the little girl to relinquish her mother as an object of desire and that object is, in
tum, incorporated into the ego as a melancholic identification with her. In this way
the mother as incorporated object becomes the girl's first identification.
Identification, however, is not finalised here, with the little girl's loss of the mother as
object of desire and subsequent identification with her. And whether one does, or
does not, ascribe to the psychoanalytic view that the initial entry into the symbolic is
attained by the relinquishment of jouissance and incestuous and homosexual desire,
the force of symbolic law can only be effective, can only sustain itself, through a

continued reiteration of socially acceptable identifications and gendered subject
positions that include, but extend beyond, one's sexual orientation. As Butler (1993,
p. 105) notes "identifications are never fully and finally made; they are incessantly
reconstituted".

Symbolic law, however, does not enforce certain normative subject positions by
reiteration alone. Butler (1993, p. 100) suggests that:
certain identifications and affiliations are made, certain
sympathetic connections amplified, precisely in order to institute
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a disidentification with a position that seems to saturated with
injury or aggression [or punishment], one that might, as a
consequence be occupiable only through imagining the loss of
viable identity all together.
The acquisition, then, of identity, of subjectivity requires not only an acquiescence to
the continued enforcement of normative, gendered identifications, but also the loss of
alternate possibilities under the threat of the loss of identity within the symbolic
altogether. In this way, Butler (1993, pp. 14-15) writes, the symbolic should be
thought of as "a series of normatizing injunctions that secure the borders of sex
through the threat of psychosis, abjection, psychic unlivability" In other words,
confronted with the threat of "psychosis, abjection, psychic unlivability", the
individual strives to identify with a gendered ideal, an idealised sense of self, in order
to retain a culturally sanctioned identity within the symbolic and to avoid taking up
an abject subject position.

Here, Butler is primarily (but not exclusively) concerned with the idealisation of
heterosexuality, and thus the abjection of non-heterosexual subject positions. Her
analyses, however, of the dynamics involved in the symbolic order's hold on power,
can be brought to bear on other social formations which fix the boundaries of
normative gendered subject positions. For women, the attainment and maintenance of
an always tenuous identification with an ego-ideal involves a complex and on-going
engagement with those ideal identifications sanctioned by the symbolic as correct or
proper enactments of femininity, and thus the abjection, the disidentification with
others.
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Butler, in fact, specifically uses the institutionalisation of motherhood to illustrate
"the anguish and tenor" ( 1987/2004, p. 27) that stepping outside the boundaries of
discursively prescribed gender norms generates. She argues that discourse creates the
illusion that, for women, motherhood is instinctually and biologically, rather than
socially, prescribed. This cultural and discursive prescription deems the woman who
is unable, or does not wish to become a mother as somehow faulty and denies her the
right to "assume adult womanhood to the full, to prove [herself], to be 'like other
women' (Rich (1976/1986 p. 25).

Kristeva (1977/1989, p. 161) argues further that motherhood is not only socially
prescribed, but both religiously and secularly consecrated. Similarly, Adrienne Rich
(197611986, p. 34) cites a strict demarcation set up in "patriarchal mythology, dreamsymbolism, theology [and] language" where two ideas operate "side by side". On the
one hand the "female body is impure, corrupt, the site of discharges, bleedings,
dangerous to masculinity, a source of moral and physical contamination, 'the devil's
gateway.' On the other hand, as mother the woman is beneficent, sacred, pure,
asexual, nourishing". This binary that polarises women as either "good or evil, fertile
or barren, pure or impure" (Rich, 1986, p. 34) creates both a set of ideal
identifications towards which women strive and the spectre of abjection, the risk of
losing one's identification with an ideal (and consecrated) femininity. To fail to
accomplish this ideal, through the experiences of miscarriage, stillbirth or abortion,
calls into question a woman's right to claim a culturally legitimate feminine subject
position, and so deals her, I would argue, Freud's 'narcissistic blow'. That is, a loss in
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her ego in her failure to identify with a constructed ego-ideal; a loss that does not
occur "irrespectively of the object" (Freud, 1984, p. 262), but is intertwined with the
loss of the foetus or baby.

Eng and Kazanjian (2003, p.5), like Butler, have noted Freud's changing inscription
of melancholia and also his assertion that both mourning and melancholia are "the
reaction to the loss of a loved person ... or one's country, liberty, an ideal, and so
on" [italics added] (Freud, 1917/1984, p. 252). They suggest that the multiplicity of

losses indicated here opens the way to interpret melancholia as something other than
a statically defined pathological failure to resolve loss. Instead, they assert that
"melancholia creates a realm of traces open to signification" (2003, p. 4) and that the
'condition' "offers a capaciousness of meaning in relation to losses encompassing the
individual and the collective, the spiritual and the material, the psychic and the social,
the aesthetic and the political" (Eng & Kazanjian, 2003, p. 3). By this they mean that
melancholia and its symptomatology may signify beyond the individual and his
illness, and point to the meanings of loss in a broader cultural context.

In terms of miscarriage, stillbirth and abortion, then, I argue that melancholia does

indeed point beyond the pathology of those women who exhibit Freud's melancholic
symptoms to reveal the political and cultural attitudes of Western societies towards
pregnancy loss, motherhood and the women who are unable or do not want to bring a
child to term. These attitudes I explore through the poetry of five Australian,
American and African American poets: Gwendolyn Brooks' "The Mother"
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(194511963), Sylvia Plath's "Three Women: A Poem for Three Voices" (196211981),
Anne Sexton's "The Abortion" (1962/1981), Judith Wright's "Stillborn" (1970/1986)
and Lucille Clifton's "The Lost Baby Poem" (1972). The poems' ongoing
engagement with pregnancy loss, speak not only to the crippling effects of the loss of
the loved object, the baby or foetus, but to the loss of an idealised self. The loss of
self and crisis of identity that the poems express, I will argue, expose the roles played
by the prevailing medical, psychoanalytic, legal and social discourses and their
attitudes to pregnancy loss, in exacerbating that very loss. Further, I will show, that
the over-arching polarisation of women discussed above, results in a loss of an ideal
feminine subject position, a narcissistic blow that manifests, both in psychical and
physical terms, as an identification with its polar extreme, its abject other: Sue
Gillett's (1998, n.p.)"doubly abjected mother-of-the-corpse".
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II

A Silenced Voice:
The Cultural Non-Existence of Miscarriage and Stillbirth

Oakley, McPherson and Roberts (1990, p. 5) report that "world-wide, around one
million women become pregnant everyday [and] at least half of these pregnancies end
in miscarriage or stillbirth". Reports suggest a more conservative (though still high)
figure of around twenty per cent in western, industrialised countries (Layne, 1997, p.
294; Hindmarch, 2000, p. 16). Despite these figures which indicated that loss in
pregnancy is a common and widespread experience, such maternal losses, at least in
Western societies, seem veiled in a "conspiracy of silence (or denial)" (Oakley, et al,
1990, p. 104). Research indicates that women who have suffered miscarriage or
stillbirth did not know, or did not realise that they knew, anyone who had suffered
similarly (Reinharz, 1987, p. 235; Layne, 1997, p. 290). This research, alongside the
lack of accepted rituals for mourning pregnancy loss (Oakley et al, 1990, p. 104) in
western societies, testifies to this conspiracy of silence and denial, to what
anthropologist Linda Layne (1997, p. 292) has called a "culturally sanctioned nonexistence" of pregnancy loss. Whether this non-existence takes the form of silence,
denial that pregnancy loss constitutes a grievable loss at all, or both, it insinuates
itself across the spectrum of pregnancy loss, from the earliest miscarriage to the
stillbirth of a full-term baby.

1

1
It is not my intention to imply that all pregnancy losses are equivocal losses, nor that all such losses
are always subject to the same degree of silence and denial. It is necessary to point out, however, that
the divide between the terms 'miscarriage' and 'stillbirth' is an arbitrary one, subject to legalized
changes both temporally and spatially.
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Judith Wright and Sylvia Plath, both of whom experienced pregnancy loss, Wright,
an ectopic pregnancy in 1956 (Brady, 1998, p. 196) and Plath, miscarriage in 1961
(Anselment, 1997, p. 32n), foreground this silence and denial in their respective
poems, "Stillborn" and "Three Women". Here, I will demonstrate how each poet
engages this silence, arguing that ideologically contradictory attitudes towards the
'life' (or non-life) of the unborn child are, to a large degree, responsible for these
silences and further that these silences disallow a 'normal' resolution of grief,
encourage maternal blame and, therefore, lead to a melancholic self-reproach.

Wright's "Stillborn" (1970/1986) uses a first person narrator to relate a third person
plural experience of stillbirth, a 'they' of which the narrator may or may not be a part.
This narrator offers an explicit engagement with the silence surrounding pregnancy
loss. The first stanza of the poem reads:
Those who have once admitted
within their pulse and blood
the chill of that most loving
that most despairing child
known what is never told the arctic anti-god,
the secret of the cold.
Here stillbirth is defined as a chilling secret, "never told", known only to those who
have experienced it. In using the pronoun 'those', Wright implies a shared experience
of loss and suffering, however, in actuality, the women suffer in isolation from
others, both those others who share the experience of pregnancy loss and those who
do not. The poem invokes here a sense of the presence of the unborn child in one's
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"pulse and blood", in one's most basic anatomical functions in a literal sense, and in
one's psychic existence at a metaphorical level and Wright conflates this presence,
the 'chill' of this most loving and despairing child with "what is never told" in her
description of this secret as "the secret of the cold". This conflation, in the repeated
use of the words chill, cold and arctic, gives the reader a sense that both the 'chill of
the child' and "the secret of the cold" pulse through the women's veins. The secret
reverberates within, on a closed circuit, coursing through the women's bodies but
never flowing without. In the final stanza, the narrator intensifies this invocation of a
secret confined within:
and I have heard them cry
when all else was lying still
'0 that I stand above
while you lie down beneath!'
The women's grief is only given an outlet or, as indicated by the use of quotation
marks, a voice, in isolation, when all else lies still. It is a cry of suffering that has no
audience other than that of Wright's narrator who, contrary to a traditional first
person narrative voice, seems endowed with omniscience, a privileged access to the
isolated voices of the women. Indeed, Wright's use of this privileged narrative voice
implies in itself, a distance between the grieving women and an outside audience.

In contrast to Wright's "Stillborn" (1970/1986), in "Three Women: A Poem for Three
Voices" (1962/1981), Plath uses three first person speakers who narrate their own
vastly different experiences of pregnancy and birth. During the course of the poem,
the first voice labours and gives birth to a wanted baby; the second suffers a
miscarriage or stillbirth, while the third relinquishes her daughter after an unwanted
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pregnancy that is possibly the result of rape 2 . In combination, these three voices
'speak' to the wide variety of emotion and affect that the experience of pregnancy
and birth may engender. Moreover, Plath's efforts to give voice to the multifaceted
experience of pregnancy and birth acquire a very real, literal dimension when one
considers that, as Ted Hughes (1981, p. 292) writes, Plath wrote the poem for radio
and it was produced on the BBC's Third Programme, on 19 August 1962. However,
whilst the three voices literally narrate their experiences, Plath only affords actual
speech to the first voice, in references to her "words" and her "little lullaby" to her
newborn son. Plath denies any form of oral interaction with others to the second and
third voices, whose experiences of pregnancy and birth are less than ideal. At the
onset of her miscarriage or stillbirth the second voice quotes her boss in the lines:
And the man I work for laughed: 'Have you seen something awful?
You are so white, suddenly.' And I said nothing.
Throughout the poem the second voice narrates her loss but does not literally 'speak'
with, or to others in the poem, nor does she ever refer to her miscarriage or stillbirth
in those terms. Instead, this voice only ever refers to her loss indirectly in lines such
as "the small red seep" and "It is usual, they say, for such a thing to happen". She
cannot speak in direct terms of her loss and suffers her grief in silence and isolation:
There is the moon in the high window. It is over.
How winter fills my soul! And the chalk light
Laying its scales on the windows, the windows of empty offices,
Empty schoolrooms, empty churches. 0 so much emptiness!
There is this cessation. This terrible cessation of everything.

2

Plath's reference to "the great swan" recalls the myth of Leda who is raped by the god Zeus,
disguised as a swan.
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Here, Plath infers a sense of the second voice's isolation from the life that surrounds
her in "the moon in the high window" 3 . She sees or senses in the moonlight the
emptiness and cessation that surrounds her as if she has been deserted. Like Wright,
Plath uses the stillness of night to foreground this sense of being alone in the world,
of having no other to bear witness to and validate this grief. The second voice
intensifies this sense of isolation in her references to her husband. Of the three voices,
she is the only one to mention a husband or partner: He "will understand" and "love
me through the blur of my deformity". He stands at a distance, however, from her
loss, not appearing 'in person' until the final two stanzas of the poem:
I am at home in the lamplight. The evenings are lengthening.
I am mending a silk slip: my husband is reading.
In these lines there is a sense of some time having passed in "the evenings are

lengthening". Her husband is not involved in her loss and grief but appears only in
its aftermath when she thinks that she has "been healing". The two attend to their
separate interests and there is no engagement between them over their loss; in fact, it
remains only her loss, her "deformity"; a silenced and isolated but continuing 'ache'.

In contradiction to the interpretation of Plath's second voice as an account of

pregnancy loss, the critic/academic David Holbrook (1976, p. 193) contends that the
second voice's 'small red seep' is "a 'show' which indicates to the woman that she is
pregnant". While a show certainly indicates pregnancy, it more accurately indicates
the culmination of pregnancy, a sign of impending labour. He goes on to assert that
this voice has given birth (1976, p. 198) and that the lines "The mirror gives back a

3

I return to the further significance of Plath's references to the moon in Chapter VI.
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woman without deformity ... " indicate that she has recovered her self-interest "after
the intense preoccupation of the confinement" (1976, p. 198). I believe that
Holbrook's assertions constitute a serious misinterpretation of the account that this
voice gives, but I do not mean to suggest that Plath needed to be more literal, nor that
any special insight is required to interpret the poem. Rather, interpretations such as
Holbrook's demonstrate a typical and profound lack of knowledge and understanding
of pregnancy loss and a refusal to engage with the subject of such a loss.

Holbrook's study provides a remarkable example of the non-existence of pregnancy
loss in a broader cultural context. This non-existence is characterised by, not one, but
several silences that overlap and sometimes beget one another. And these silences
have at their heart contradictory attitudes towards the 'life' of the foetus and the
contingency of life itself. The following statements, both quoted by Oakley,
McPherson and Roberts (1990) and referring to stillbirth and miscarriage
respectively, reflect this contradiction:
an article in the medical journal the Lancet in 1977 called the
occurrence of "death in utero ... extraordinarily chilling and
repugnant" (p. 167);
'oh pooh, miscarriages,' an acquaintance said to me recently,
'miscarriages are nothing- everybody's had a miscarriage' (n.p.).

These statements strikingly reveal two affective responses to pregnancy loss that
originate from opposite ends of an emotional spectrum, repugnance and indifference,
and they situate stillbirth and miscarriage at those opposing ends. And yet, in reality,
temporal and spatial arbitrariness characterise the divide between the two losses. For
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example, Oakley et al (1990, pp. 12-13) report that in Great Britain at the time of
publication, the death of a child after 28 weeks gestation but before birth constitutes a
stillbirth, while in 2000 Hindmarch (2000, p. 16) writes that a death occurring as
early as 20 weeks gestation constitutes stillbirth. Oakley et al (1990, p.l3) also point
out that
in 1960, 61 per cent of babies born weighing 1500 g ... or under were
born alive, compared with 78 per cent in 1981. Of those very low
birthweight babies born in 1960, 33 per cent were still alive at the
end of the first month of life, but this figure had more than doubled,
becoming 68 per cent by 1981 ... the mother of such an infant in 1960
may thus have thought of herself as having a miscarriage, whereas the
same mother in 1980 may emerge ... with a live and healthy baby.
Is the miscarriage, then, of a 27 week old foetus in 1960 any less 'chilling and
repugnant' than the stillbirth of a baby of the same age in 2000? Or, for that matter, in
2005, is the woman who miscarries a 19 week old foetus meant to grieve any less
than the woman in the adjacent hospital bed who has given birth to a stillborn baby of
21 weeks gestation? My point here is that the affective response to miscarriage and
stillbirth, whether in the mother herself or the community in which she lives, cannot
be stringently defined alongside the stringent definitions given to the terms
miscarriage and stillbirth at any point in time. The mother who has experienced
miscarriage or stillbirth may thus be subject to a reaction of indifference, repugnance
or both.

These two ends of the spectrum, repugnance and indifference, lie at the core of the
silences that permeate the discourse of pregnancy loss. Layne (2003, pp. 1886-1887)
points out that advances in ante-natal and neo-natal care and an emphasis on happy
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outcomes in publications about pregnancy have created an expectation (and an
illusion) that pregnancy loss has been eliminated. Certainly, the rise and prescription
of institutional ante-natal care for pregnant women in the twentieth century has seen a
parallel drop in stillbirth, neo-natal and maternal mortality rates (Oakley, 1984, pp.
297 -98). There can also be no doubt that increased knowledge of pregnancy-related
problems, such as eclampsia and rhesus incompatibility, has contributed to these
survival rates. However, as Oakley (1984, p. 33) attests, clinical ante-natal care had
its roots in the "redefinition of obstetrical deaths as a social problem". And at the
heart of this social problem lay an assumption that such deaths were due to "problems
of maternity or 'mothercraft', which in their tum are fundamentally problems of
education" (Local Government Board, Great Britain, 1913, p. 330, cited by Oakley,
1984, p. 261). The institutionalisation of ante-natal care requires that women are
constructed as uneducated and inept in the care of their babies and pregnancies and
are thus at fault should any problems arise, in order for it to succeed in terms of
ensuring that women present for such care. Oakley (1984, p. 237) presents this
argument quite forcefully in stating that "women are deceived in assenting to [a]
technological system of childbirth management by believing that only thus will they
safely achieve motherhood". Whilst I would not go so far as to say that the institution
and on-going success of clinical ante-natal was, or is, based on a deliberate strategy
of deception, I would argue that the on-going and voluntary participation of women
in the institution certainly depends for its success on the perception that the
medicalisation of pregnancy ensures positive outcomes.
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Debra Pollock (1997, pp. 12-13) further asserts that this emphasis on positive
outcomes extends to our cultural lore and anecdotes. She points out that our stories of
pregnancy and birth focus on happy results, adding that such stories, where the
mother, the baby or medical staff have triumphed over danger, disaster and death,
deliver "order from disorder and pleasure from abandon, transgression and pain".
They expose "the possibility of death or deformity only to deny it ... and, in turn,
invite a sense of superiority to death, disaster, and deformity". These narratives, that
seem to follow a traditional plot structure of storytelling with beginning, climax and
denouement, are, according to Pollock (1997, p. 13), "ritually repeated" and lock
"new parents into a narrative script that simply lacks room for stillbirth, miscarriage,
abortion, and deformity". These stories exclude and silence stories of failure, stories
that end in death, rather than life.

Sue Gillett (1998, n.p.) writes that "our broad cultural faith in medical technology has
divided birth from death as mutually incompatible categories. Birth, in our cultural
symbology, is synonymous with Life". To this I would add that, increasingly,
throughout the twentieth century, medical technology has made pregnancy itself
synonymous with life. Oakley (1984, pp.l55-59) reports that by 1940 hormonal
pregnancy tests were available, the foetal heart could be heard by stethoscope, the
foetal skeleton was visible by x-ray and by 1957 ultrasound had begun to be used to
visualise the foetus. Prior to these developments a woman's sensory experience of the
existence of her unborn baby was limited to an awareness of the baby's movements
and even then generally not until well after the first trimester. With these advances
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come an engagement with the foetus that includes sight and sound for both the
mother and the wider community. Alice Adams (1993, p. 269) speaks of her
entrancement and romance with ultrasound images of foetal growth in the 1966 book

A Child is Born (Furuhjelm, Ingleman-Sundberg & Wirsen). She describes the foetus
in these images as "illuminated against a dark background ... a kindly alien in orbit
... the mother's body is the empty universe in which the fetus creates itself'. Such
advances in the auditory and visual perception of the foetus constitute pre-term
'babies' as individual subjects, with subject status and rights and a life of their own, a
life that, while requiring the mother's body for survival, is represented as independent
of that body.

Contrary to the reality of the prevalence of pregnancy loss, such focuses on positive
outcomes in pregnancy and the representations of independent life within the
pregnant body make pregnancy loss seem unnatural, repugnant and abhorrent. Such
losses threaten our tenuous and illusionary superiority to death, and speaking of such
losses threatens to reveal the very disorder of our corporeal existence, the disorder
that scientific discourse seeks to contain. This message must be silenced and thus
isolates women who cannot sustain the life of a foetus or baby, inscribing them with
difference, otherness, abjection.

At the farthest remove from a response of repugnance at pregnancy loss, lies one of
indifference. Rosenfeld (1991, n.p.) reports that "previously it was assumed that
women did not mourn the loss of an unborn child as they would the loss of a living
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child" 4 • However, she goes on to cite a number of studies (Peppers & Knapp, 1990;
Leppert & Pahlka, 1984; Hardin & Urbanus, 1986) that have found that there are "no
differences in the intensity or the pattern of grief among women who had experienced
a spontaneous abortion, stillbirth or neonatal death". Nevertheless, despite such
findings, Bourne and Lewis (1991, p. 1167), distinguishing miscarriage from
stillbirth, assert that "a healthy individual should bounce back fairly rapidly from a
miscarriage, and extended grief is an indication that something is not right". Like
Freud, Bourne and Lewis attribute pathology to grief that remains unrecognised as a
valid reaction to the loss of a pregnancy. They fail to take into account the lack of
opportunities to express and resolve such grief in culturally appropriate ways, or the
fact that the repugnance which may greet foetal losses condemns women to abjection,
to "a horrific silence of the flesh" (Gillett, 1998, n.p.). They go on to imply that the
prevalence of miscarriage is one reason why one should not "make too much of
miscarriage". The two maintain, however, a conspicuous silence on the reasons why
prevalence should invalidate extended grief and, for that matter, remain silent about
what they define as 'extended grief'. They do not consider that the taboo on speaking
of pregnancy loss effectively negates prevalence in a social context, nor do they
recognise here the arbitrary nature of the limits imposed on the terms 'miscarriage'
and 'stillbirth'. At what point of a pregnancy, then, does 'extended grief' become a
valid reaction to a pregnancy loss?

4

Bourne and Lewis (1991, p. 1167) similarly report that since the 1970's attitudes towards "perinatal
bereavement have changed profoundly".
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Such indifferent attitudes towards at least certain pregnancy losses invalidate and
pathologise grief over those losses. It is an attitude that does not take into account the
increasing visual and auditory opportunities for "prenatal bonding" (Layne, 1997,
p. 299) that medical technology provides. Furthermore, a grief that is deemed 'not
right', and therefore deemed a sign of illness, is a grief that cannot be freely
expressed, that can only be iterated to the self, in order to avoid the stigma of being
labelled mentally abnormal. In this way the sanction against speaking one's grief over
pregnancy loss and the lack of appropriate cultural rituals for expressing that loss
restricts access to opportunities that may help to lead to a resolution of that grief.

In 'Mourning and Melancholia', Freud (1917/1984, p. 252) asserts that any

interference with the 'normal' process, and progress, of mourning is "useless or even
harmful", but he does not elaborate on what harmful effects this interference might
produce. I would argue that the silence that greets pregnancy loss interferes with a
'normal' process of mourning, and its harmful effects may indeed be the symptoms of
self-reproach and self-reviling that Freud attributes to a pathological failure to resolve
loss. In contradiction to Freud, Butler (1997, p. 185) sees "the internal violence"
wrought by melancholia as an "indictment of the social forms that have made certain
kinds of losses ungrievable". She writes that "where there is no public recognition or
discourse through which ... loss might be named and mourned, then [the symptoms
of] melancholia take on cultural dimensions of contemporary consequence"
(1997 /2004, p. 250). In other words this non-recognition, this silence 'speaks', in the
case of pregnancy loss, to not only the horror or indifference that such a loss
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engenders but also to, as Pollock (1997, p. 14) suggests, a deeper story, one that
attributes maternal blame to such a loss. A cultural silence that attributes blame may
well produce the very symptoms that Freud, ignoring the social context in which such
symptoms arise, deems pathological in the individual. The poems do indeed suggest
maternal blame, self-reproach and reviling and I discuss this further in Chapter IV.
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III

Caught in the Crossfire:
The Lost Voice of Abortion Loss

Despite the effective legalisation of abortion in the United States in 1973 (Petchesky,
1981, p. 209), continuing demonstrations and violence at abortion clinics in the
United States (Jarvis Thomson, 1995, n.p.) dramatically attest to the fact that
opposition to abortion has not abated5 . The abortion debate remains a contentious
issue, one that the strident voices of both the pro-life and pro-choice movements have
kept alive in our cultural consciousness, and perhaps conscience. At a discursive and
political level, silence does not characterise this debate. But what of the women who
undergo abortions? And what of the women who experience grief or ambivalence
over their choice to have an abortion? Are they free to speak, to express this grief or
ambivalence?

In this chapter I will demonstrate how Lucille Clifton's "The Lost Baby Poem",
Gwendolyn Brooks' "The Mother" and Anne Sexton's "The Abortion" invoke the
difficulties women face in speaking of their abortions and expressing the negative
effects abortion has had on their lives. All three poems were written prior to 1973 and
whilst I acknowledge that "an illegal or self-induced abortion ... is painful,
dangerous and cloaked in the guilt of criminality" (Rich, 1986, p. 267), I will argue
that the poems reveal problems of address when it comes to speaking of abortion, that
5

As does the current emotive debate in the Australian parliament over whether the Federal Health
Minister Tony Abbott, a pro-life supporter, or the Therapeutic Drugs Administration Board should
have control over the distribution of the 'abortion pill' RU 486.
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this reflects the persistent social and moral stigma of aborting one's child which, in
tum contributes to the silencing of women who have abortions, regardless of the legal
status of abortion.

Barbara Johnson (1986, p. 36) writes of Lucille Clifton's "The Lost Baby Poem" that
it is "unclear whether the child has been lost through abortion or through
miscarriage". In this section I treat the poem alongside those that deal explicitly with
abortion, Gwendolyn Brooks' "The Mother" and Anne Sexton's "The Abortion",
because the three poems share characteristics in terms of their structures of address.
"The Lost Baby Poem" is a first person monologue in which the narrator seems to
speak directly to the child she has lost through induced or spontaneous abortion.
Johnson (1986, pp. 28-30) points out that this address constitutes an apostrophe in the
sense that "it involves the direct address of an absent, dead or inanimate being by a
first-person speaker" who "throws voice, life, and human form into the addressee".
The first two lines of the poem read:
the time i dropped your almost body down
down to meet the waters under the city
In addressing the baby, Clifton attempts to give it life and form, however, at the same
time, she undermines this personification in her description of the baby's body as an
"almost body" and in the final line of the poem's second stanza:
if you were here i could tell you these
and some other things
In using the subjunctive mood in these lines, Clifton throws doubt on the construction

of the baby as the direct addressee of the poem, "if you were here i could tell you".
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Here the speaker reveals a contradiction between the 'you' who is the grammatical
object of address but at the same time cannot be told. Who, then, does the speaker
address? In the poem's first stanza the speaker states that she has dropped the baby
into a city's sewerage system, "the waters under the city", but this is followed by the
lines:
what did i know about waters rushing back
what did i know about drowning
or being drowned

These lines suggest that the same waters that have carried away the almost life of the
child have returned to drown the speaker herself. Both are engulfed; the lost baby
literally and the mother figuratively, by the grief, guilt and ambivalence that the
pregnancy loss has provoked. In this passage, Clifton correlates the fate of the mother
with that of her lost baby, and, in the same way that the waters return, the narrator's
outwardly directed address returns to her, unheard and unanswered by the object of
that address.

Johnson (1986, p. 32) notes that in Brooks' "The Mother" "the structures of address
are shifting and complex". Like Clifton's poem the first section of "The Mother"
addresses a 'you', but here this 'you' is not an aborted baby, but seems to be the
mother herself. The first lines of the poem read:
Abortions do not let you forget.
You remember the children you got that you
did not get.
The second line places the narrator as both the grammatical subject and the object of
address, but in the preceding line 'abortions' are the grammatical subject. Abortions
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assume control of the speaker, forcing the 'you' to remember the children and to
muse on a future devoid of the positive and negative aspects of mothering those
children:
You will never neglect or beat
Them, or silence or buy with a sweet.
You will never wind up the sucking thumb
Or scuttle off ghosts that come.
These lines seem to imply that the mother will never have the opportunity to neglect,
beat, silence or buy these children. However, by including 'you will never silence
them' Brooks invites an alternate reading; that these aborted children cannot be
silenced. She reinforces this reading in the first lines of the poem's second section:
I have heard in the voices of the wind the voices of my
dim killed children.
These lines mark the point in the poem where the speaker ends her second person
self-address and begins her first person monologue. But even here it is the voices of
her aborted children that have initiated this monologue. Her words are a response to
the voices, the address of her aborted children. Johnson (1986, p. 33) points out that
in this poem "the initiative of speech seems always to lie in the other". The mother, as
always addressed by abortions and aborted children, reflects the silencing of women
who have abortions, but who remain continually addressed by the politics of both
pro-life and pro-choice adherents. In the poem's first section, abortions both force a
continuing remembrance of the aborted children and initiate the narrator's selfaddress and in the second the voices of those children initiate the speaker's response.
She exists in order to respond to them, to appease these phantoms "at the breasts they
never suck".
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Johnson (1986, p. 34) notes that, by the end of the poem, the speaker writes herself
into silence, in the reduction of her vocabulary to repetition and a final line that
consists of a single word:
Believe me, I loved you all.
Believe me, I knew you, though faintly, and I loved, I loved you
All.
Whilst indeed there is here a sense of the finality of the speaker's words, that nothing
more can be said, I would add that her entire address to her aborted children is a
reiteration and that it cannot result in finality. Her address is not stated here for the
first and only time. Brooks uses the past tense "I have said" to indicate that the
speaker's words are a repetition; the speaker's words cannot affect an 'end' to the
consequences of her abortions. In the first line of the poem the speaker has already
stated that there is no end to abortions and she intensifies this in her struggle to make
clear cut pronouncements in the aftermath of those abortions: "Oh, what shall I say,
how is the truth to be said?" and in her inability to define the 'lives' of the children:
Since anyhow you are dead.
Or rather, or instead,
You were never made.
Brooks' speaker may write herself into silence but the reiteration of her address and
the irresolution evident in these lines indicate that she is bound to return endlessly to
responding to the address of her abortions and her children. This irresolution and
repetition points to the narrator's continued engagement with her losses, an
unresolved grief that suggests a Freudian pathological melancholia.

28

Like Brooks, Anne Sexton uses a shifting pattern of address in "The Abortion". The
poem begins with a two line italicised refrain: "Somebody who should have been
born/ is gone" which twice interrupts the poem's first person narration. Johnson

(1986, p. 35) likens this interruption to "a voice-over narrator taking superegoistic
control of the moral bottom line". She adds that the refrain "puts the first person
narrator's authority into question without necessarily constituting the voice of a
separate entity". In the fourth stanza, Sexton reinforces this sense of a split between a
self who narrates the circumstances of her abortion and a self who judges those
choices:
and me wondering when the ground would break,
and me wondering how anything fragile survives.
Rather than following a first person narratorial pattern that would see these lines read
'and I wondered', Sexton substitutes the first person object pronoun 'me' for the 'I'.
In referring to herself as the object of her narration, the speaker seems to stand
outside herself, watching and perceiving an other who is about to have an abortion.
The speaker enhances this sense of the self as simultaneously an other in the final
stanza:
Yes, woman, such logic will lead
to loss without death. Or say what you meant,
you coward ... this baby that I bleed.
In this stanza the speaker explicitly addresses herself but in doing so she also reveals
that the narrative which precedes this stanza is not outwardly directed but only
iterated to the self.

6

A point I shall return to in Chapter VI.
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The three poems discussed here all invoke problems of address when it comes to
speaking of abortion. Addresses to the self and to aborted children reveal the
difficulties these speakers face in directing their speech, their grief and their
ambivalence about their abortions to an outside audience. Judith Jarvis Thomson
(1995, n.p.) points out that the heart of the pro-life movement's argument against
abortions seems to lie in its assertion that "abortion at any stage, from conception on,
is a violation of the right to life, and thus is murder". However, she goes on to note
that "many opponents of abortion do make exceptions. For example, they are
prepared to allow abortion where the pregnancy is due to rape or incest, or where the
woman's life is at risk if the pregnancy continues". Such exceptions fundamentally
undermine the argument that embryos or foetuses have an intrinsic right to life. All
lives, it would seem, are not created equal, at least for some opponents of abortion.
As Petchesky (1981, p. 220) asserts, the abortion issue resonates beyond the status of
the foetus to include "many social and political meanings- about the family,
sexuality [and] the position of women." She points out that the real heart of antiabortion rhetoric lies in a desire to control women's sexuality. She states that "if a
woman can control her pregnancies, there is no built-in sanction against her having
sex when, how, and with whom she pleases" (Petchesky, 1981, p. 229). To speak of
one's abortion then, is to reveal an active sexuality that does not have procreation as
its sole purpose. It is to risk a charge of promiscuity when a restrained, passive
sexuality is the feminine ideal.
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Zucker observes (1999, p. 768) that throughout western history "'mandatory
motherhood' has been promoted and enforced" and that this mandate has "found [its]
way into existing psychological theories about women's identities, roles and positions
in society". She adds that this mandate and these theories pathologise women who
choose to abort, who choose not to bear and raise the foetus they carry. Petchesky
(1981, p. 233) argues further that pro-life ideology embraces "the values of
motherhood as they have been propagated since the late eighteenth century: as
woman's true destiny, her 'calling', that which defines her above all else". In the face
of a pervasive ideology that deems women who choose not to mother as sick or
abnormal, women who have abortions must remain silent or be vulnerable to a charge
of abnormality and pathology.

Whilst pro-life ideologies condemn women who abort to silence at a personal level, at
a political level the pro-choice movement plays its part too, in disallowing the
expression of grief or ambivalence over an abortion. Borgmann and Weiss (2003, p.
41) write that supporters of abortion on demand often react to a societal discomfort
with the issue of abortion by shying away from open discussion of and support for
abortion. They suggest that this silence "plays into the hands" of anti-abortion
activists who "want the public to associate abortion with secrecy, trauma, stigma,
guilt, fear and shame". Pro-choice supporters, it would seem, are in a double bind. On
the one hand silence reinforces these associations; whilst on the other to acknowledge
that abortion can produce negative effects, including ambivalence and grief, on the
individual, seems to bolster the anti-abortion cause. This political resistance to
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acknowledging that abortions may engender negative affects in the women who have
them effectively invalidates responses of ambivalence or grief and denies these
women the opportunity to openly express these emotions.

The imposition of silence on women who choose to have an abortion, may provide, as
I have argued in the previous chapter, Freud's 'harmful interference' with the normal
progression of mourning. More than this, however, it isolates them from support and
understanding, and other women who have experienced ambivalence and grief over
an abortion. These silences, isolation and lack of support leave only the condemning
voices of pro-life adherents, who loudly characterise women who choose abortions as
immoral, and "wantonly and selfishly sexual" (Stotland, 2001, n.p.). In the face of
this pervasive characterisation, these women, cannot, in Butler's (1997/2004, p. 248)
words, repudiate an identification with the figure of this immoral and promiscuous
abject woman.

32

IV
Maternal Blame in the Discourses of
Miscarriage and Stillbirth

Freud writes (1917/1984, p. 260) that "self-reproaches to the effect that the mourner
himself is to blame for the loss of the loved object", are a sign that mourning has
slipped over into a pathological melancholia. He adds that these self-reproaches are
really directed against the lost object which has become a melancholic identification
in the ego. However, as I have discussed in the preceding chapters, factors such as the
silence and horror or indifference that greet pregnancy loss encourage maternal blame
and interfere with a 'normal' progression of grief. In this chapter I will demonstrate
how Plath and Wright reflect the blame, guilt and self-reproach following a
miscarriage or stillbirth and argue that these effects are not necessarily a sign of a
pathological identification with the lost object, but are a consequence of the part
medical discourse plays in situating blame with the women who have experienced
such losses.

In "Three Women", Plath reiterates the commonness of pregnancy loss in the lines:

It is usual, they say, for such a thing to happen.
It is usual in my life, and the lives of others.
I am one in five, something like that. I am not hopeless.

These lines indicate the naturalness, the commonness of, in particular miscarriage.
Despite this, a sense of the speaker's fundamental culpability and an air of selfrecrimination pervade the poems. In "Three Women" Plath's use of first person
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declarative constructions is pronounced across all three voices. However,
fundamental differences lie in Plath's execution of them. In the second voice these
are often marked with an agency, both grammatical and semantic, that is lacking in
the first and third. Consider the lines:
The sun is down. I die. I make a death
and
I am restless. Restless and useless. I, too, create corpses.
Both the lines suggest agential action, if not intention. The "I'' is the 'maker' and
'creator' of death and corpses. The following two lines seem to subvert this sense of
agency:

Tap, tap, tap steel pegs. I am found wanting
and
I am accused. I dream of massacres.
Here, Plath uses passive construction to suggest that the speaker is characterised, or
acted upon by someone or something else. But 'who' finds lack, 'who' accuses?
Again and again it is the second voice who finds the lack in herself:
Quiet, like the little emptinesses I carry.
Blunt and flat enough to feel no lack. I feel a lack.
In contrast the first person declaratives in the first and third voices suggest a sense of

being in itself, and of being acted upon. The first voice, the birth of her child
impending, tastes, sees, hears and describes herself and then her labour as follows:
When I walk out I am a great event.
I do not have to think, or even rehearse.
What happens in me will happen without attention.
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A power is growing on me, an old tenacity.
I am breaking apart like the world. There is this blackness,
This ram of blackness. I fold my hands on a mountain.
The air is thick. It is thick with this working.
I am used. I am drummed into use.
These lines suggest a certain power of the labouring mother- but it is a power, an old
tenacity, that is outside her control. The first voice is "used" by this power and
although it comes from within her body it is, at once, outside of her individual body.
This power is part of her biological function as a woman and she does not need "to
think, or even rehearse", only passively let this archaic power do its work.

The third voice, about to give birth to an unwanted child, remembers the conception
of her baby:
And the great swan, with its terrible look,
Coming at me, like a castle, from the top of the river ...
I wasn't ready. The white clouds rearing
Aside were dragging me in four directions
I wasn't ready.
The swan comes at her: she is a passive object unprepared for intercourse or
pregnancy (or both). Plath reinforces this sense of the third voice being acted upon, of
being not responsible for her pregnancy when, the birth of her child immanent, the
third voice says:
I am a mountain now, among mountainy women.
The doctors move among us as if our bigness
Frightened the mind. They smile like fools.
They are to blame for what I am, and they know it ...
Plath does not elaborate on the doctors' blameworthiness. Perhaps she points to a
collective male culpability for sexual assault or the difficulties women faced in
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obtaining safe and legal abortions before 1973. Whatever the case, it is clear that this
voice is given no agency in the conception of her baby, her pregnancy or delivery.

Paradoxically, it is the first and third voices who are, despite their lack of agency, full
and plentiful. The first, in her pregnancy, is "a great event" and "a seed about to
burst", and in her motherhood, "a river of milk" and "a warm hill". The third, despite
her ambivalence, is a mountain. It is only when she becomes a 'bad' mother by
relinquishing her newborn daughter and motherhood that she becomes empty, asking
"What is it I miss?"

Plath's second voice attributes to herself both a lack and blame for the power to
produce death. This self-accusation finds a parallel in Wright's "Stillborn". The final
stanza of the poem reads:
Alive, they should be dead
Who cheated their own death,
And I have heard them cry
When all else was lying still
'0 that I stand above
While you lie down beneath!'
Such women weep for love
Of one who drew no breath
And in the night they lie
giving the breast to death.
In similar fashion to "Three Women", in the line "giving the breast to death" Wright
constructs her subjects as nurturers of death. This line can be seen as both an agential
or passive position; the women 'feed' death, or Death feeds on them. However, the
expression 'giving the breast', a common and benign alternative to breastfeeding,
semantically implies, in the word 'giving', a free act. In any case, whether one
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chooses to interpret this line in an active or passive sense, the result is the same - a
nurturance of death. In these lines there is an insinuation of guilt, made both by
Wright's narrator, whose subjects have "cheated their own deaths", and the subjects
themselves in their words '"0 that I stand above/ While you lie down beneath'".

The sense of culpability, of guilt and of complicity with death that run throughout the
two poems stands in direct conflict with Plath's invocation of the prevalence and, in
many cases, unavoidability of miscarriage and stillbirth. And yet medical discourses,
both prior to and since the medicalisation of pregnancy, have consistently implicitly
and explicitly generated contradictions to this message. Ann Oakley (1984, p. 213), in
charting the ascendency of clinical ante-natal care in the 20th century, reports that
when antenatal care began, a few per cent of pregnant women were
regarded as 'at risk' of their own or their fetuses' mortality and
morbidity. The task of antenatal care was to screen a population of
basically normal pregnant women in order to pick up the few who
were at risk of disease or death. Today the situation is reversed, and
the object of antenatal care is to screen a population suffering from
the pathology of pregnancy for the few women who are normal enough to
give birth with the minimum of midwifery attention.
A redefinition of pregnancy as pathology necessarily implies that there are possible
'cures' for any problems that may arise. Indeed, despite protestations that the
m£Uority of early pregnancy losses in particular are inevitable, modem, empirically
based remedies have been put forward and, like their earlier counterparts, have
invariably focussed on restrictions of maternal behaviour or diagnosis of maternal
problems. Oakley (1984, p. 17) reports that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
advice to pregnant women as to the avoidance of foetal harm consisted of
admonishments to avoid dietary irregularity, excessive laughing, immoderate
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dancing, conjugal enjoyments, excessive socialising and disturbances of the mind.
Whilst one may today, be amused by some of this 'advice', it contains many
similarities to that being espoused by the end of the twentieth century. Oakley,
McPherson and Roberts (1990, p. 45) report that "in perhaps about half of all
miscarriages, it is possible to identify some factor or factors which might have
contributed to the likelihood of miscarriage" [italics added]. Despite the authors' care
in the wording of this statement (indicated by italics) to avoid making any definitive
claims as to the causes of miscarriage, these factors are listed and discussed in terms
of those problems that may arise in the foetus, the father and the mother. Two foetal
problems discussed by the authors are chromosomal and non-chromosomal
abnormalities, arising from either "one-off accidents that occur during the formation
of individual egg and sperm cells" (Oakley et al, 1990, p. 47), or situations where one
of the parents themselves carries a chromosomal abnormality" 7 (Oakley et al, 1990,
p. 47). The three examples of non-chromosomal abnormalities that are given are
spina bifida (spinal cord abnormalities), anencephaly (foetus develops without brain)
and exomphalos (foetus develops without an abdominal wall). Only spina bifida is
discussed in any detail here, including the possibility that taking folic acid
supplements before and during the early stages of pregnancy may help in its
prevention. Although it is not specified in this text, my own experiences of pregnancy
tell me that this advice is only directed at mothers and not fathers. Fathers, however,
are not delivered completely of responsibility when it comes to factors that may
possibly affect the foetus. Listed here (Oakley et al, 1994, pp. 53-63) are paternal age,
exposure to lead and smoking.
7

These problems obviously implicate either the mother or the father.
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By far, the greatest number of problems seems to be associated with the maternal.
Those that are discussed here (Oakley, McPherson & Roberts, 1994, pp. 49-68)
include anatomical abnormalities such as uterine malformations and cervical
incompetence, fibroids, immunological mechanisms, hormonal deficiencies, maternal
age, maternal psychological factors, including stress, contraceptive use, previously
induced abortion, previous miscarriage, sexual intercourse, vaginal examinations,
alcohol use, smoking, diet, including advice on the avoidance on certain foods linked
with listeriosis, occupation, working, chemical exposure, lead exposure, irradiation,
ultrasound, drug use, polycystic ovarian syndrome, accidents, and to this I would add
placental insufficiency. Although the discussion of many of these problems contain
disclaimers as to the verifiability of the evidence that they cause pregnancy loss, the
fact remains that this staggering list is headed "Factors which may affect miscarriage"
and, like its seventeenth and eighteenth century counterparts, contains many
examples of a focus on maternal behaviour and emotional state. Restrictions on diet
and work and the prescription of certain medications necessarily implies that to
ignore such guidelines amounts to a neglect of the health of one's baby, while the
continuing emphasis on a woman's psychological well-being again suggests that her
deficiencies, her deviations from a 'normal' state of mind has a direct bearing on
foetal survival. Oakley et al (1994, p. 53) do point out that there is "no proof
whatsoever" that psychological problems cause pregnancy loss but in contradiction to
this they state that "it is also quite possible that the seeming effectiveness of some of
the treatments for miscarriage ... is not due to the treatment as such, but rather to the
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mother feeling less anxious because something is being done" (Oakley et al, 1994, p.
63). In other words, certain treatments offered may provide merely a placebo effect,
solving the real problem of a woman's emotional defectiveness.

I do not wish to imply that the known 'possible' causes of pregnancy loss are invalid.
I simply want to show how the genealogy and preponderance of knowledge, whether
obstetrical, gynaecological, genetic, embryological, foetological or psychological,
about these causes either directly or indirectly imply problems of a maternal origin.
Nor do I wish to suggest that the medical establishment explicitly blames women for
problems they may have of a chromosomal, anatomical or immunological nature.
However, as Hindmarch (2000, p. 16) writes, medical terminology such as 'placental
insufficiency' and 'cervical incompetence' encourages blame. I would go further and
suggest that not only do such terms encourage maternal blame, but that they imply
the lack, failure and inadequacy of a woman's body in that body's inability to nurture
and sustain life and in its deviation from the 'normal' female body.

Such determinations of maternal blame stand in direct conflict to a discourse which
suggests that a large number of pregnancy losses are unexplainable or inevitable. In
fact, a discourse that attributes blame in certain cases of pregnancy loss but does not
attempt to explain a large number of others perhaps feeds a woman's fear of her own
responsibility in the death of her child (Was it something I did, ate, drank, thought,
did not do, did not eat and so on). In addition to the attribution of blame, these
discursive productions of the causes of pregnancy loss attribute both lack, whether
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psychological or somatic, and agency, whether that agency amounts to a wilful failure
to curb or augment one's behaviours and lifestyle, or a monstrous feminine
psychological agency that imposes its defectiveness on the pregnant body. Rather
than reflecting a pathological disposition then, blame and guilt over the loss of a
pregnancy indicates a failure to mirror an identificatory ideal of psychological and
somatic feminine nurturance, fertility and passivity. Unable to assume this subject
position, women who experience pregnancy loss suffer not only the loss of a baby but
also Freud's "narcissistic blow": a loss of their right to identify with an ego-ideal and
therefore, a relegation to an abject position outside the boundaries of that ideal.
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v
Sin, Guilt and Impurity in the Construction
of Women who Abort

Rosenfeld (1992, p. 137) reports that after a sense of relief, the most common
emotional response to abortion is guilt. Where Freud would see this guilt as an
indication of pathology, Stotland (2001, p. 27) writes that "the psychiatric aspects of
abortion exemplify the impossibility of discussing the impact of a life experience
outside the social context in which in occurs" [sic]. In this chapter I will show how
Clifton, Brooks and Sexton engage the guilt and self-reproach that may follow an
abortion and argue, as in the preceding chapter, that these responses are not
necessarily a symptom of a pathological mental illness, but rather reflect the social
context in which abortion occurs and the moral and legal attitudes towards women
who have abortions.

Lucille Clifton's "The Lost Baby Poem" implicitly imparts a sense of self-reproach
for the death of a foetus. Barbara Johnson (1986, p. 36) has pointed out that, in this
poem, "it [is] unclear whether the child has been lost through abortion or through
miscarriage" and that this ambiguity "points to the notion that any death of a child is
perceived as a crime committed by the mother, something a mother ought by
definition to be able to prevent" (1986, p. 38). The first stanza of the Clifton poem
reads:
the time i dropped your almost body down
down to meet the waters under the city
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and run one with the sewage to the sea
what did i know about waters rushing back
what did i know about drowning or being drowned
In stark contrast to the benign sense of a baby lost in the title of the poem these lines
suggest the narrator's complicity in the death; whether literal, in the case of a
miscarried foetus that has either fallen or been placed into a drain, or metaphoric, in
the narrator's conflation of herself with an abortionist.

The narrator re-stresses her blame in the third and final stanza of the poem:
if I am ever less than a mountain
for your definite brothers and sisters
let the rivers pour over my head
let the seas take me for a spiller
of seas let black men call me stranger
always for your never named sake
Here the narrator makes it clear that she must atone for the loss of her baby by being
a "mountain", a protector, shelter and tower of strength, for her living children. She
also establishes the terms of her punishment should she fail to prove herself a
mountain for them; she must drown as her baby has done. In referring to herself as a
"spiller of seas" the narrator implies that her crime has been to waste life, whether
one takes this line to mean that she has spilled the seas as one would spill blood, or
that she literally conflates herself with a 'spiller', a fishing trawl line that drains the
sea of life.

In the second stanza of the poem, however, the speaker tempers this self-reproach and
blame by introducing the social circumstances that would have made the birth of her
baby perhaps less desirable than its loss:
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you would have been born into winter
in the year of the disconnected gas
and no car we would have made the thin
walk over Genessee hill into the Canada wind
to watch you slip like ice into strangers hands
Johnson (1986, p. 36) points out that here Clifton invokes "a life of hardship, flight
and loss ... [conflating] the scene of Eliza's escape in Uncle Tom's Cabin with the
exile of draft resisters during the Vietnam War". In doing so Clifton reflects on the
social and racial marginalisation of black Americans. During the Vietnam War
Murray (1971, p. 71) noted that "the burden of the draft has fallen disproportionately
on black, as it has on lower-class youth in general" and he pointed to a number of
factors that accounted for this disparity. He asserted that due to discrimination in
education and employment, few black Americans attended college or graduate school
and so could not gain draft deferments on educational or occupational grounds. They
were also less likely to be rejected for the draft for physical reasons because they had
less access to regular medical care and were thus unaware of any medical conditions
they may have had. They were also less sophisticated than whites in regard to a
knowledge of which conditions would grant them a deferment (Murray, 1971,
pp. 69-70).

In Brooks too, one sees blame and guilt alongside an inability to control the
circumstances under which abortions become necessary. In her address to her aborted
children, Brooks' narrator establishes the guilt she feels when she asks "Though why
should I whine,/ Whine that the crime was other than mine?". She emphasises this
guilt by using the vocabulary of immorality and crime, "sinned", "seized", "stole",
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"poisoned" to describe her actions in aborting those children. However, she questions
the assumption of her own guilt by qualifying these statements with "if' and in the
line "Believe that even in my deliberateness I was not deliberate." The narrator feels
that a crime has been committed against her children and that blame needs to be
attributed but she cannot firmly establish where this blame lies.

In Sexton's "The Abortion" the two line refrain that echoes through the poem

continually draws the reader away from the speaker's narration to censure her,
whether from within or without. In the final lines of the poem this censure comes
explicitly from within the speaker:
Yes, woman, such logic will lead
To loss without death. Or say what you meant,
you coward ... this baby that I bleed.
Here the speaker turns on herself and assumes responsibility and blame for her
abortion. The final line can be read in two ways; the baby is bleeding from the
narrator's body or the narrator is bleeding the baby in the sense that she has caused
the baby itself to bleed. While both readings signal the narrator's guilt and selfreproach, the second gives a clear sense that the speaker feels that she has murdered
her baby. This second reading constructs the speaker as a murderer and strongly
reflects pro-life ideology, which propounds "that a human being's life begins at
conception" (Jarvis Thomson, 1995, n.p).

Sexton confounds the speaker's assumption of guilt and blame in her reference to the
Grimm brothers' fairytale, "Rumpelstiltskin". The miller's daughter of the tale is
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forced to spin gold from straw for the greedy king because of her father's
boastfulness. When Rumpelstiltskin appears and offers to complete the task for her,
she is forced into a bargain to save her own life that will see her give up her first born
child. After his birth, Rumpelstiltskin comes to claim the child but takes pity on the
girl and suggests another bargain; if she can discover his name she may keep the
child. She eventually triumphs, answering his question and keeping her child. But the
narrator of the poem cannot win in such a way. The nameless abortionist is not
Rumpelstiltskin and no bargain will allow the speaker to keep her child. One can
perceive in the tale the miller's daughter's powerlessness over the course her own life
takes. She is always at the mercy of others; her father's boastfulness, the king's greed
and Rumpelstiltskin' s pity. In identifying herself with the miller's daughter, the
speaker of the poem reveals her own lack of choice and impotence in controlling the
course of her life.

Whilst the three poems discussed here clearly demonstrate a sense of guilt, blame and
self-reproach, this stands alongside a powerlessness to make any other choice.
Abortions certainly give women a degree of power over their own lives and bodies
but the poems reveal that, in some cases, the decision to have an abortion results from
an underlying impotence, an inability to control one's social and financial
circumstances and an inability to adequately and safely control one's reproductive
life.
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This ambiguity, between guilt and power, innocence and powerlessness, reflects too,
the stringent divide between the construction of the 'good' woman and the 'bad'.
Carol Gilligan (1982, pp. 70-71) asserts that the choice to have an abortion brings
women "into conflict with the conventions of femininity, particularly the moral
equation of goodness with self-sacrifice". The "good woman", she adds, puts others
before self and "masks assertion in evasion". Freud (1932/1991, p. 149) similarly
suggests that a preference for "passive aims" characterises female psychology, adding
that "passive aims" are not the same as passivity and the achievement of these aims
may require "a large amount of activity". Both writers imply here that femininity is a
mask or, as Butler (1993, p. 1) asserts, a performance of a "regulatory ideal". Perhaps
then, the ambiguity evident in the speakers' refusal to emphatically assert their
responsibility over the choice to have abortions can be read as an attempt to reclaim
this mask, a non-assertive, self-sacrificing and powerless feminine subject position.

This reading, alongside the sense of criminality, guilt and self-reproach in the poems
points to the loss of, not only pregnancy and motherhood, but an ego-ideal. These
women suffer Freud's (1917/1984, p. 262) "narcissistic blow to the ego" and their
guilt and self-reproach reflect not a pathological melancholia but the loss of a sense
of the self as a mirror of an imposed feminine ideal
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VI
The Anti-Mother:
Subjectivity and Abjection after Pregnancy Loss

Elizabeth Grosz (1994, p. 58) writes that one's self-conception "is directly linked to
the social meaning and value of the sexed body". For women this sense of self relies
heavily on both their physical and emotional abilities to produce and nurture children,
thus the experiences of miscarriage, stillbirth and abortion assault this sense of an
ideal self. In this chapter I will discuss how my five selected poems reveal an
alienation from, and loss of this nurturing and fertile ideal and display, instead, an
identification with the figure of the "doubly abjected mother-of-the corpse" (Gillett,
1996, n.p.), the literal embodiment of the construction of the feminine as deathbearing.

In "Three Women" Plath explicitly addresses the loss of an ideal self in the aftermath

of a foetal loss when her second voice states "I am dying as I sit. I lose a dimension"
This line suggests not only the death of a foetus but that of a part of the self. Plath
further emphasises this loss when the second voice refers to herself in the third person
in the lines "the mirror gives back a woman without deformity" and "This woman
who meets me in windows - she is neat". These lines reveal a split between her inner
and outer selves. Her external self remains unchanged, but she specifically equates
her pregnancy loss with bodily deformity in the lines:
I can love my husband, who will understand.
Who will love me through the blur of my deformity
As if I had lost an eye, a leg, a tongue.
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She cannot reconcile her unchanged, outer reflection with an inner self that she
perceives as permanently marred, deformed and altered by the loss of her pregnancy.

Plath enhances this invocation of a self deformed by pregnancy loss with numerous
allusions to nature. These allusions are pronounced across all three voices but Plath
employs subtle differences in the second voice that cast this voice beyond the sphere
of normal womanhood and into an abject otherness. As the three women labour,
references to the sea and the moon suggest the archaic connections between the
phases of the moon, tidal regularity and the cyclical and rhythmical nature of
women's corporeal existence in terms of reproduction. Plath's first voice declares:
The moon's concern is more personal:
She passes and repasses, luminous as a nurse.
and
Waiting lies heavy on my lids. It lies like sleep,
Like a big sea. Far off, far off, I feel the first wave tug
Its cargo of agony toward me, inescapable, tidal.
These lines invoke both a woman's menstrual cycle and the 'ebb and flow' of labour
pains. Here, Plath associates the sea and tides with the birth of new life and
emphasises, in her use of the word "inescapable", the naturalness of the process of
labour and birth, as well as the naturalisation of women's supposedly innate corporeal
links to nature. Similarly, the third voice describes the lights of the delivery room as
"flat red moons ... dull with blood" Here again, Plath points out the connection
between menstruation, reproduction and nature. In characterising defilement as one
form of the abject, Kristeva (1982, p. 71) distinguishes menstrual blood from other
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excremental products such as urine and faeces by suggesting that the former "stands
for the danger [death within life] issuing from within the identity. Whether in terms
of menstruation or post-partum bleeding, blood that issues from the uterus symbolises
the lack of life within the uterus. In the above lines, Plath aligns reproductive blood
with the sea, the tides and the moon, standard symbols of feminine corporeality, and
whilst, as Kristeva understands it, this blood's association with non-life remains
abject, it does not seep outside its associations with that femininity.

Plath's second voice too, refers to the same metaphors for the feminine:
There is the moon in the high window.
It is she that drags the blood-black sea around

Month after month ...
In the first voice, Plath specifically aligns the sea with labour and the bringing forth
of new life, but in the above lines the sea becomes oozing, blood-filled and lifeless. A
further reference to reproductive blood lies in the lines:
It is a love of death that sickens everything.
A dead sun stains the newsprint. It is red.

Here, Plath invokes the sun, symbol of life, light and reason and, therefore, the nonfeminine. But this sun, like the sea above, oozes blood. In her pregnancy loss, the
second voice has brought forth death, and this death seeps outside its feminine
boundaries to infect and taint the "sun", a symbol of the masculine, and "newsprint",
a symbol of culture rather than nature. Plath gives further emphasis to this in her very
use of the word 'sun' with its homophonic connection to 'son', especially when one
considers that the poem was originally produced for radio.
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In the first voice Plath associates pregnancy and birth with the fertility of nature,

"leaves and petals attend" the labouring woman and in her new motherhood "dawn
flowers", swifts shriek and cows moo. Even the third voice, who gives up her baby,
sees pregnancy as a time of fecundity:
The flowers in this room are red and tropical.
They have lived behind glass all their lives,
they have been cared for tenderly.
In these lines the third voice likens new-born babies to exotic, hothouse flowers who
have been nurtured and protected within the warmth and safety of the uterine walls.
In contrast, coldness, barrenness and drought characterise the second voice's
descriptions of herself:
She is the vampire of us all. So she supports us,
Fattens us, is kind. Her mouth is red.
I know her. I know her intimatelyOld winter-face, old barren one, old time bomb;
These little black twigs do not think to bud,
Nor do these dry, dry gutters dream of rain.
In these lines the second voice suggests her intimacy with a cold, barren, deathbearing and monstrous, archaic femininity, and associates herself with a dry and
barren landscape. In her barrenness, the second voice cannot lay claim to, nor identify
with an ideal femininity, one that is fertile and abundant. She can only attempt an
enactment, a masquerade of this ideal identity:
I draw on the old mouth.
The red mouth I put by with my identity
A day ago, two days, three days ago.

Butler (1993, p. 3) writes that the assumption of gendered subjectivity "requires an
identification with the normative phantasm of 'sex,' and this identification takes place
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through a repudiation which produces a domain of abjection". This "normative
phantasm" produces a binary that strictly delineates women as either, in Adrienne
Rich's (1986, p. 34) words, good, fertile and pure, or evil, barren, and impure. This
binary creates one legitimate subject position, one ego-ideal that a woman must
emulate, or be branded non-woman and cast into Butler's "domain of abjection".
After her pregnancy loss, Plath's second voice is unable to identify with an ideal
feminine subject position and describes herself "as a shadow, neither man nor
woman". In this line, Plath completely distances her from her femininity. She has lost
her sense of self as identified with an ego-ideal, and with this loss she cannot effect a
disidentification with the barrenness, coldness and deadliness of the figure of the
abject woman.

The other four poems discussed here similarly reflect the loss of this ego-ideal and
subsequent identification with abjection. In "Stillborn" Wright refers to the "dark
birth" of a stillborn baby as one that "ends in double loss". The doubleness of this
loss suggests not only the loss of a pre-term baby's life but also the loss of the
pregnant body, the fertile and nurturing state that such a body implies and the loss of
confidence in the femininity of the female body, and what that body ought to be able
to accomplish: the successful delivery of a live and healthy child. In referring to a
double loss, Wright distances women who have experienced pregnancy loss from the
perception of the self as fertile and nurturing, and she underscores this distance at a
grammatical level when she refers to these women as "those' at the beginning of the
poems first and second stanzas and "such women" in the third. Wright's use of the
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determiner "such" and the determining pronoun "those" isolates these women as
other, and from the world of 'normal' women.

Like Plath, Wright figures this distance in terms of polar extremities, referring to the
chill of stillborn babies and to "the arctic anti-god,/ the secret of the cold." The
binaries operating here, between warmth and coldness, fertility and barrenness,
exemplify Rich's invocation of the delineation of the 'good' and 'bad' woman. This
line also recalls for me Persephone's descent into Hades' realm, the anti-god's realm,
a dark and barren world at the furthest remove from the fecundity of her mother
Demeter's world. Like Persephone, these women 'know' the anti-god and his cold,
dead kingdom. The poem, however, elicits too a comparison between "those" women
and Demeter herself.:
they still reach hands across
to grave from flowering earth,
to shroud from living dress.
Like Demeter, these women reach for their lost children and perhaps see themselves
as bringers of famine, barrenness and death to the world. Both the figures of
Persephone and Demeter invoke the binary that operates to normatise the figure of
the fertile and life giving mother and abject the barren and death-bearing woman. In
the poem, those who have suffered stillbirth find themselves cast outside the warmth
and abundance of a temperate world and outside an ideal femininity, instead
identifying with its cold, bleak and infertile extremities and abjection.
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Clifton too, reflects this binary in "The Lost Baby Poem". Like Plath and Wright she
uses references to the cold and ice, but in this poem these metaphors do not signify
the barrenness of the speaker's body, but this mother's inability to provide a life of
comfort, protection and warmth for her child:
you would have been born into winter
in the year of the disconnected gas
and no car ...
As discussed earlier, these lines invoke the social conditions that make, in some
circumstances, abortion the only choice a woman feels that she can make. What
underlies this, however, is the implication that if a woman cannot provide adequate
comfort and protection for her child, she has no right to motherhood. This implication
becomes apparent in the final stanza of the poem:
if i am ever less than a mountain
for your definite brothers and sisters
let the rivers pour over my head
let the sea take me for a spiller
of seas let black men call me stranger
always for your never named sake
Here the speaker suggests that a proper enactment of motherhood entails being a
'mountain'; solid, strong, protecting. It implies abundance and fertility in direct
contrast to the cold and barren landscape into which the speaker's lost baby would
have been born.

Like Wright, Clifton also implicitly suggests a sense of the "double loss" that a
pregnancy loss may generate. In the poem's first stanza she conflates the loss of her
unborn child with her own fate in the aftermath of that loss:
what did i know about waters rushing back
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what did i know about drowning
or being drowned
After dropping her baby into sewage waters, the narrator feels herself figuratively
drowned by the after effects of the loss of her baby. Tide-like, the waters rush back to
engulf the narrator as they have done her baby. The speaker's engulfment suggests a
continued engagement with the loss of her pregnancy and, therefore, Freud's
pathological failure to resolve that loss. However, in having the same waters swallow
up both, Clifton implies Wright's "double loss", inferring that, in some part, the
speaker's life has been lost along with her pregnancy. The similarity between the fate
of both mother and child becomes even more apparent in the poem's final stanza,
with the speaker's imperative "let black men call me stranger/ always for your never
named sake". A stranger is one who is alien, whose name, like the speaker's unborn
child, is unknown. The baby has been denied life and unless the speaker atones for
her pregnancy loss, she feels that she too must be alienated from and denied the life
of her community and her identity within it. Rich (1977/1986, p. 75) reports that "the
black nationalist movement has declared that birth control and abortion are
'genocidal' and that black women should feel guilty if they do not provide children to
carry on the black struggle for survival". Whether due to spontaneous or induced
abortion, then, this loss extends beyond the loss of a child to include a loss of identity
and abjection within the speaker's specific cultural community.

Sexton's "The Abortion" alludes too, to an upheaval in identity and self-regard
following a pregnancy loss. Sexton obscurely prefigures this change in the poem's
first stanza in the line "I changed my shoes, and then drove south". The speaker's
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change of shoes indicates that she is casting off a self that is associated with the sense
of the fertility of the budding earth with which Sexton begins the stanza: "Just as the
earth puckered its mouth,/ each bud puffing out from its knot". These lines align the
blossoming of flowers with the release and fertilisation of ova, but the speaker drives
away, distancing herself from this fertile landscape. Sexton further alienates the
speaker from this fertility in the second and third stanzas when she compares the
passing landscape to the roads the speaker actually travels:
Up past the Blue Mountains, where
Pennsylvania humps on endlessly,
wearing, like a crayoned cat, its green hair,
its roads sunken in like a gray washboard;
where, in truth, the ground cracks evilly,
a dark socket from which the coal has poured,
The second stanza invokes a green and fruitful landscape that undulates like the body
of a sleeping cat; quiet and serene but full with the promise of the animation and
playfulness of cats. However, as Sexton's use of the word 'crayoned' implies, this
landscape is a caricature, an imitation that the speaker cannot emulate. Far from the
greenness and fecundity depicted in the first two stanzas, the road the speaker travels
is grey, cracked, barren, dry and lifeless. Sexton substitutes a hollowed-out landscape
that has been sacked of the richness of organic matter. This dark socket, devoid of
coal, connotes the womb and the abortion that the speaker will undergo, a bleeding of
not only organic 'waste', but of "the fullness that love began", the richness and
completeness of pregnancy and motherhood.
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Following her abortion, the speaker finds herself incomplete and empty, a partial self
that has been robbed of the wholeness that her pregnancy engendered. The poem's
sixth stanza reads:
Returning north, even the sky grew thin
like a high window looking nowhere.
The road was as flat as a sheet of tin
Here, Sexton employs the metaphors of the window, flatness and thinness to connote
the lifelessness and emptiness within, in terms of both the speaker's no longer
pregnant body and her 'road', a journey without the prospect of motherhood and
hence devoid of the notion of the self as life-giving and nurturing. Instead, she
identifies with abjection, seeing herself, like a sheet of tin, as cold, lifeless and twodimensional and as a "dark socket" pouring 'organic waste'. This emptiness within
recalls Freud's (1917/1984, p. 254) assertion that "in mourning it is the world which
has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself[italics added]. In this
poem, however, the speaker's words may be taken to suggest not a melancholic
condition, but a loss in the ego, a loss of a feminine identificatory ideal.

Brooks' "The Mother" marks a departure from the other four poems discussed here in
that it does not foreground the association between femininity, and more particularly
motherhood, and nature. Nevertheless, the speaker of the poem remains
circumscribed by motherhood. Johnson (1986, p. 34) argues that the speaker's
apostrophe to her aborted children is an "attempt to absolve herself of guilt" by
keeping them alive. The title of the poem seems to support the argument that these
children 'live'. The speaker is a mother in the sense that her children 'live' in her
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psyche and make demands on her intellectual and emotional energy as any children
would. However, one should not forget that in the poem's first line the speaker
attributes her inability to forget to abortions. It is thus abortions that, paradoxically,
keep these children alive and make the speaker a mother. But this mother will never
'mother' her children. She "will never wind up the sucking thumb/ Or scuttle off
ghosts that come". Instead, her mothering consists of those biological and physical
aspects of new motherhood: "I have contracted. I have eased/ My dim dears at the
breasts they could never suck". In these lines, Brooks uses symbols of new life and
motherhood, contractions and breast feeding, but connects these symbols to death; to
the theft of her children's lives and the poisoning of their breaths. Jeffner Allen
(1984, p. 321) writes that a discursive focus on fragments of the female body, on the
reproductive and biologically nurturing aspects of that body, marks it "with a
significance that is presumed to be intrinsic, eternal and to characterize the whole of
the female body". That is, that a woman's biological capacities to give birth and to
nurture the new-born inscribe her entire body and being as one that, naturally must
mother. In this poem, Brooks inscribes her narrator within traditional markings of the
life-bearing and nurturing mother, however she perverts this association between the
mother's body as life-giving, instead characterising this mother as an abject bearer
and nurturer of the dead in her references to contractions and breast-feeding.

In each poem discussed here, the five poets make manifest the loss of identity and
self that pregnancy loss engenders. Freud would argue that this loss in, and
impoverishment of, the ego point to a melancholic pathology, but as
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Eng (2000, p. 1278) notes "he makes no social distinctions between the various lost
objects engendering melancholia". Here, Eng points out that Freud's formulation of
melancholia fails to take into account the varying societal and cultural significance
that any loss may, or may not, engender. The five poems discussed here exemplify
the problems inherent in divorcing loss from its social context. In each poem, women
who have experienced miscarriage, stillbirth or abortion are unable to lay claim to
that maternal, fertile and nurturing identity that, in Butler's (2004, p. 27) words,
discourse has decreed an instinctual and organic necessity for the attainment of a
legitimate feminine subject position. Pregnancy loss results in not only the loss of a
child, but also in the loss of an identification with a discursively produced 'proper'
enactment of femininity. The loss of this subject position entails the recognition that
one has fallen short of a feminine ego-ideal and casts these women into an abject
otherness.
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VII

Conclusion

In commenting on Freud's (1932/1991, p. 162) assertion that "the feminine
situation", or rather the acquisition of a feminine identity, is predicated upon a
woman's childhood wish for and subsequent adult attainment of motherhood, Zucker
(1999, n.p.) observes that his theory leaves "no room ... for women who choose not
to, or are unable to bear children, except as examples of pathology. Freud's
prescription of motherhood as the only path to "true womanhood" (Zucker, 1999,
n.p.) reflects a broader cultural "resorption of femininity within the Maternal"
(Kristeva, 197711989, p. 163). In the face of the pervasive ideology that women must
mother, the woman who experiences miscarriage, stillbirth or abortion, finds herself
unable to assume the subject position 'mother' and, therefore, cannot fulfil the
demands of an ego-ideal that has been constructed around the correlation and
identification of femininity with maternity.

As the five poems discussed here demonstrate, the loss of an identification with this
ideal following a pregnancy loss, assaults a woman's gendered sense of self, calling
into question her very femininity and rendering her an abject being. This "narcissistic
blow" does indeed, as Freud (191711984, p. 262) suggests, "produce the picture of
melancholia", manifesting as guilt, self-reproach and an extreme loss of self-regard
and self-conception. But to define these effects as signs of pathology ignores the
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silence and insinuation of maternal blame that greet pregnancy loss and ignores the
meaning and importance that western cultures invest in motherhood.

A pregnancy loss exemplifies what Eng and Kazanjian (2003, p. 5) have called the
multifaceted qualities of loss, its significance beyond the individual's loss of a loved
object. The poems, in turn, reflect this multiplicity. Their "avowals of and
attachments to loss ... produce a world of remains as a world of new representations
and alternative meanings" (Eng & Kazanjian, 2003, p. 5), they open up Freud's
stringently defined version of melancholia, allowing a re-reading of the symptoms of
melancholia as a response to the discursive production of pregnancy loss and
motherhood itself.

***
A final word. In the face of a pervasive silence, perhaps of even more importance
than the poets' engagement with the polysemy of pregnancy loss, is the voice that
they give to such losses; a voice that speaks for every woman, including myself, who
has grieved a pregnancy loss, and found themselves consigned to Gillett's (1998,
n.p.) "horrific silence of the flesh" and near-suffocated by a loss that could not be
spoken.
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Appendix of Poems.
Three Women
A Poem for Three Voices
Setting: A Maternity Ward and round about

FIRST VOICE:
I am slow as the world. I am very patient,
Turning through my time, the suns and stars
Regarding me with attention.
The moon's concern is more personal:
She passes and repasses, luminous as a nurse.
Is she sorry for what will happen? I do not think so.
She is simply astonished at fertility.
When I walk out, I am a great event.
I do not have to think, or even rehearse.
What happens in me will happen without attention.
The pheasant stands on the hill;
He is arranging his brown feathers.
I cannot help smiling at what it is I know.
Leaves and petals attend me. I am ready.
SECOND VOICE:
When I first saw it, the small red seep, I did not believe it.
I watched the men walk about me in the office. They were so flat!
There was something about them like cardboard, and now I had caught it,
That flat, flat, flatness from which ideas, destructions,
Bulldozers, guillotines, white chambers of shrieks proceed,
Endlessly proceed--and the cold angels, the abstractions.
I sat at my desk in my stockings, my high heels,
And the man I work for laughed: 'Have you seen something awful?
You are so white, suddenly.' And I said nothing.
I saw death in the bare trees, a deprivation.
I could not believe it. Is it so difficult
For the spirit to conceive a face, a mouth?
The letters proceed from these black keys, and these black keys proceed
From my alphabetical fingers, ordering parts,
Parts, bits, cogs, the shining multiples.
I am dying as I sit. I lose a dimension.
Trains roar in my ears, departures, departures!
The silver track of time empties into the distance,
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The white sky empties of its promise, like a cup.
These are my feet, these mechanical echoes.
Tap, tap, tap, steel pegs. I am found wanting.
This is a disease I carry home, this is a death.
Again, this is a death. Is it the air,
The particles of destruction I suck up? Am I a pulse
That wanes and wanes, facing the cold angel?
Is this my lover then? This death, this death?
As a child I loved a lichen-bitten name.
Is this the one sin then, this old dead love of death?
THIRD VOICE:
I remember the minute when I knew for sure.
The willows were chilling,
The face in the pool was beautiful, but not mine-It had a consequential look, like everything else,
And all I could see was dangers: doves and words,
Stars and showers of gold--conceptions, conceptions!
I remember a white, cold wing
And the great swan, with its terrible look,
Coming at me, like a castle, from the top of the river.
There is a snake in swans.
He glided by; his eye had a black meaning.
I saw the world in it--small, mean and black,
Every little word hooked to every little word, and act to act.
A hot blue day had budded into something.
I wasn't ready. The white clouds rearing
Aside were dragging me in four directions.
I wasn't ready.
I had no reverence.
I thought I could deny the consequence-But it was too late for that. It was too late, and the face
Went on shaping itself with love, as if I was ready.
SECOND VOICE:
It is a world of snow now. I am not at home.
How white these sheets are. The faces have no features.
They are bald and impossible, like the faces of my children,
Those little sick ones that elude my arms.
Other children do not touch me: they are terrible.
They have too many colors, too much life. They are not quiet,
Quiet, like the little emptinesses I carry.
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I have had my chances. I have tried and tried.
I have stitched life into me like a rare organ,
And walked carefully, precariously, like something rare.
I have tried not to think too hard. I have tried to be natural.
I have tried to be blind in love, like other women,
Blind in my bed, with my dear blind sweet one,
Not looking, through the thick dark, for the face of another.
I did not look. But still the face was there,
The face of the unborn one that loved its perfections,
The face of the dead one that could only be perfect
In its easy peace, could only keep holy so.
And then there were other faces. The faces of nations,
Governments, parliaments, societies,
The faceless faces of important men.
It is these men I mind:
They are so jealous of anything that is not flat! They are jealous gods
That would have the whole world flat because they are.
I see the Father conversing with the Son.
Such flatness cannot but be holy.
'Let us make a heaven,' they say.
'Let us flatten and launder the grossness from these souls.'
FIRST VOICE:
I am calm. I am calm. It is the calm before something awful:
The yellow minute before the wind walks, when the leaves
Tum up their hands, their pallors. It is so quiet here.
The sheets, the faces, are white and stopped, like clocks.
Voices stand back and flatten. Their visible hieroglyphs
Flatten to parchment screens to keep the wind off.
They paint such secrets in Arabic, Chinese!
I am dumb and brown. I am a seed about to break.
The brownness is my dead self, and it is sullen:
It does not wish to be more, or different.
Dusk hoods me in blue now, like a Mary.
0 color of distance and forgetfulness!-When will it be, the second when Time breaks
And eternity engulfs it, and I drown utterly?
I talk to myself, myself only, set apart-Swabbed and lurid with disinfectants, sacrificial.
Waiting lies heavy on my lids. It lies like sleep,
Like a big sea. Far off, far off, I feel the first wave tug
Its cargo of agony toward me, inescapable, tidal.
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And I, a shell, echoing on this white beach
Face the voices that overwhelm, the terrible element.
THIRD VOICE:
I am a mountain now, among mountainy women.
The doctors move among us as if our bigness
Frightened the mind. They smile like fools.
They are to blame for what I am, and they know it.
They hug their flatness like a kind of health.
And what if they found themselves surprised, as I did?
They would go mad with it.
And what if two lives leaked between my thighs?
I have seen the white clean chamber with its instruments.
It is a place of shrieks. It is not happy.
'This is where you will come when you are ready.'
The night lights are flat red moons. They are dull with blood.
I am not ready for anything to happen.
I should have murdered this, that murders me.
FIRST VOICE:
There is no miracle more cruel than this.
I am dragged by the horses, the iron hooves.
I last. I last it out. I accomplish a work.
Dark tunnel, through which hurtle the visitations,
The visitations, the manifestations, the startled faces.
I am the center of an atrocity.
What pains, what sorrows must I be mothering?
Can such innocence kill and kill? It milks my life.
The trees wither in the street. The rain is corrosive.
I taste it on my tongue, and the workable horrors,
The horrors that stand and idle, the slighted godmothers
With their hearts that tick and tick, with their satchels of instruments.
I shall be a wall and a roof, protecting.
I shall be a sky and a hill of good: 0 let me be!
A power is growing on me, an old tenacity.
I am breaking apart like the world. There is this blackness,
This ram of blackness. I fold my hands on a mountain.
The air is thick. It is thick with this working.
I am used. I am drummed into use.
My eyes are squeezed by this blackness.
I see nothing.
SECOND VOICE:
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I am accused. I dream of massacres.
I am a garden of black and red agonies. I drink them,
Hating myself, hating and fearing. And now the world conceives
Its end and runs toward it, arms held out in love.
It is a love of death that sickens everything.
A dead sun stains the newsprint. It is red.
I lose life after life. The dark earth drinks them.
She is the vampire of us all. So she supports us,
Fattens us, is kind. Her mouth is red.
I know her. I know her intimately-Old winter-face, old barren one, old time bomb.
Men have used her meanly. She will eat them.
Eat them, eat them, eat them in the end.
The sun is down. I die. I make a death.
FIRST VOICE:
Who is he, this blue, furious boy,
Shiny and strange, as if he had hurtled from a star?
He is looking so angrily!
He flew into the room, a shriek at his heel.
The blue color pales. He is human after all.
A red lotus opens in its bowl of blood;
They are stitching me up with silk, as if I were a material.
What did my fingers do before they held him?
What did my heart do, with its love?
I have never seen a thing so clear.
His lids are like the lilac-flower
And soft as a moth, his breath.
I shall not let go.
There is no guile or warp in him. May he keep so.
SECOND VOICE:
There is the moon in the high window. It is over.
How winter fills my soul! And that chalk light
Laying its scales on the windows, the windows of empty offices,
Empty schoolrooms, empty churches. 0 so much emptiness!
There is this cessation. This terrible cessation of everything.
These bodies mounded around me now, these polar sleepers-What blue, moony ray ices their dreams?
I feel it enter me, cold, alien, like an instrument.
And that mad, hard face at the end of it, that 0-mouth
Open in its gape of perpetual grieving.
It is she that drags the blood-black sea around
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Month after month, with its voices of failure.
I am helpless as the sea at the end of her string.
I am restless. Restless and useless. I, too, create corpses.
I shall move north. I shall move into a long blackness.
I see myself as a shadow, neither man nor woman,
Neither a woman, happy to be like a man, nor a man
Blunt and flat enough to feel no lack. I feel a lack.
I hold my fingers up, ten white pickets.
See, the darkness is leaking from the cracks.
I cannot contain it. I cannot contain my life.
I shall be a heroine of the peripheral.
I shall not be accused by isolate buttons,
Holes in the heels of socks, the white mute faces
Of unanswered letters, coffined in a letter case.
I shall not be accused, I shall not be accused.
The clock shall not find me wanting, nor these stars
That rivet in place abyss after abyss.
THIRD VOICE:
I see her in my sleep, my red, terrible girl.
She is crying through the glass that separates us.
She is crying, and she is furious.
Her cries are hooks that catch and grate like cats.
It is by these hooks she climbs to my notice.
She is crying at the dark, or at the stars
That at such a distance from us shine and whirl.
I think her little head is carved in wood,
A red, hard wood, eyes shut and mouth wide open.
And from the open mouth issue sharp cries
Scratching at my sleep like arrows,
Scratching at my sleep, and entering my side.
My daughter has no teeth. Her mouth is wide.
It utters such dark sounds it cannot be good.
FIRST VOICE:
What is it that flings these innocent souls at us?
Look, they are so exhausted, they are all flat out
In their canvas-sided cots, names tied to their wrists,
The little silver trophies they've come so far for.
There are some with thick black hair, there are some bald.
Their skin tints are pink or sallow, brown or red;
They are beginning to remember their differences.
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I think they are made of water; they have no expression.
Their features are sleeping, like light on quiet water.
They are the real monks and nuns in their identical garments.
I see them showering like stars on to the world-On India, Africa, America, these miraculous ones,
These pure, small images. They smell of milk.
Their footsoles are untouched. They are walkers of air.
Can nothingness be so prodigal?
Here is my son.
His wide eye is that general, flat blue.
He is turning to me like a little, blind, bright plant.
One cry. It is the hook I hang on.
And I am a river of milk.
I am a warm hill.
SECOND VOICE:
I am not ugly. I am even beautiful.
The mirror gives back a woman without deformity.
The nurses give back my clothes, and an identity.
It is usual, they say, for such a thing to happen.
It is usual in my life, and the lives of others.
I am one in five, something like that. I am not hopeless.
I am beautiful as a statistic. Here is my lipstick.
I draw on the old mouth.
The red mouth I put by with my identity
A day ago, two days, three days ago. It was a Friday.
I do not even need a holiday; I can go to work today.
I can love my husband, who will understand.
Who will love me through the blur of my deformity
As if I had lost an eye, a leg, a tongue.
And so I stand, a little sightless. So I walk
Away on wheels, instead of legs, they serve as well.
And learn to speak with fingers, not a tongue.
The body is resourceful.
The body of a starfish can grow back its arms
And newts are prodigal in legs. And may I be
As prodigal in what lacks me.
THIRD VOICE:
She is a small island, asleep and peaceful,
And I am a white ship hooting: Goodbye, goodbye.
The day is blazing. It is very mournful.
The flowers in this room are red and tropical.
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They have lived behind glass all their lives, they have been cared for
tenderly.
Now they face a winter of white sheets, white faces.
There is very little to go into my suitcase.
There are the clothes of a fat woman I do not know.
There is my comb and brush. There is an emptiness.
I am so vulnerable suddenly.
I am a wound walking out of hospital.
I am a wound that they are letting go.
I leave my health behind. I leave someone
Who would adhere to me: I undo her fingers like bandages: I go.
SECOND VOICE:
I am myself again. There are no loose ends.
I am bled white as wax, I have no attachments.
I am flat and virginal, which means nothing has happened,
Nothing that cannot be erased, ripped up and scrapped, begun again.
These little black twigs do not think to bud,
Nor do these dry, dry gutters dream of rain.
This woman who meets me in windows--she is neat.
So neat she is transparent, like a spirit.
How shyly she superimposes her neat self
On the inferno of African oranges, the heel-hung pigs.
She is deferring to reality.
It is I. It is !-Tasting the bitterness between my teeth.
The incalculable malice of the everyday.
FIRST VOICE:
How long can I be a wall, keeping the wind off?
How long can I be
Gentling the sun with the shade of my hand,
Intercepting the blue bolts of a cold moon?
The voices of loneliness, the voices of sorrow
Lap at my back ineluctably.
How shall it soften them, this little lullaby?
How long can I be a wall around my green property?
How long can my hands
Be a bandage to his hurt, and my words
Bright birds in the sky, consoling, consoling?
It is a terrible thing
To be so open: it is as if my heart
Put on a face and walked into the world.

73

THIRD VOICE:
Today the colleges are drunk with spring.
My black gown is a little funeral:
It shows I am serious.
The books I carry wedge into my side.
I had an old wound once, but it is healing.
I had a dream of an island, red with cries.
It was a dream, and did not mean a thing.
FIRST VOICE:
Dawn flowers in the great elm outside the house.
The swifts are back. They are shrieking like paper rockets.
I hear the sound of the hours
Widen and die in the hedgerows. I hear the moo of cows.
The colors replenish themselves, and the wet
Thatch smokes in the sun.
The narcissi open white faces in the orchard.
I am reassured. I am reassured.
These are the clear bright colors of the nursery,
The talking ducks, the happy lambs.
I am simple again. I believe in miracles.
I do not believe in those terrible children
Who injure my sleep with their white eyes, their fingerless hands.
They are not mine. They do not belong to me.
I shall meditate upon normality.
I shall meditate upon my little son.
He does not walk. He does not speak a word.
He is still swaddled in white bands.
But he is pink and perfect. He smiles so frequently.
I have papered his room with big roses,
I have painted little hearts on everything.
I do not will him to be exceptional.
It is the exception that interests the devil.
It is the exception that climbs the sorrowful hill

Or sits in the desert and hurts his mother's heart.
I will him to be common,
To love me as I love him,
And to marry what he wants and where he will.
THIRD VOICE:
Hot noon in the meadows. The buttercups
Swelter and melt, and the lovers
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Pass by, pass by.
They are black and flat as shadows.
It is so beautiful to have no attachments!
I am solitary as grass. What is it I miss?
Shall I ever find it, whatever it is?
The swans are gone. Still the river
Remembers how white they were.
It strives after them with its lights.
It finds their shapes in a cloud.
What is that bird that cries
With such sorrow in its voice?
I am young as ever, it says. What is it I miss?
SECOND VOICE:
I am at home in the lamplight. The evenings are lengthening.
I am mending a silk slip: my husband is reading.
How beautifully the light includes these things.
There is a kind of smoke in the spring air,
A smoke that takes the parks, the little statues
With pinkness, as if a tenderness awoke,
A tenderness that did not tire, something healing.
I wait and ache. I think I have been healing.
There is a great deal else to do. My hands
Can stitch lace neatly on to this material. My husband
Can tum and tum the pages of a book.
And so we are at home together, after hours.
It is only time that weighs upon our hands.
It is only time, and that is not material.
The streets may tum to paper suddenly, but I recover
From the long fall, and find myself in bed,
Safe on the mattress, hands braced, as for a fall.
I find myself again. I am no shadow
Though there is a shadow starting from my feet. I am a wife.
The city waits and aches. The little grasses
Crack through stone, and they are green with life.

Sylvia Plath
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Stillborn
Those who have once admitted
within their pulse and blood
the chill of that most loving
that most despairing child
known what is never told the arctic anti-god,
the secret of the cold.
Those who have once expected
the pains of that dark birth
which takes but without giving
and ends in double loss they still reach hands across
to grave from flowering earth,
to shroud from living dress.
Alive, they should be dead
who cheated their own death,
and I have heard them cry
when all else was lying still
'0 that I stand above
While you lie down beneath!'
Such women weep for love
of one who drew no breath
and in the night they lie
giving the breast to death.

Judith Wright
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The Lost Baby Poem
the time i dropped your almost body down
down to meet the waters under the city
and run one with the sewage to the sea
what did i know about waters rushing back
what did i know about drowning
or being drowned
you would have been born into winter
in the year of the disconnected gas
and no car
we would have made the thin
walk over Genessee hill into the Canada wind
to watch you slip like ice into strangers' hands
you would have fallen naked as snow into winter
if you were here i could tell you these
and some other things
if i am ever less than a mountain
for your definite brothers and sisters
let the rivers pour over my head
let the sea take me for a spiller
of seas let black men call me stranger
always for your never named sake
Lucille Clifton
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The Mother
Abortions will not let you forget.
You remember the children you got that you did not get,
The damp small pulps with a little or with no hair,
The singers and workers that never handled the air.
You will never neglect or beat
Them, or silence or buy with a sweet.
You will never wind up the sucking-thumb
Or scuttle off ghosts that come.
You will never leave them, controlling your luscious sigh,
Return for a snack of them, with gobbling mother-eye.
I have heard in the voices of the wind the voices of my dim killed
children.
I have contracted. I have eased
My dim dears at the breasts they could never suck.
I have said, Sweets, if I sinned, if I seized
Your luck
And your lives from your unfinished reach,
If I stole your births and your names,
Your straight baby tears and your games,
Your stilted or lovely loves, your tumults, your marriages, aches,
and your deaths,
If I poisoned the beginnings of your breaths,
Believe that even in my deliberateness I was not deliberate.
Though why should I whine,
Whine that the crime was other than mine?-Since anyhow you are dead.
Or rather, or instead,
You were never made.
But that too, I am afraid,
Is faulty: oh, what shall I say, how is the truth to be said?
You were born, you had body, you died.
It is just that you never giggled or planned or cried.
Believe me, I loved you all.
Believe me, I knew you, though faintly, and I loved, I loved you
All.

Gwendolyn Brooks
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The Abortion

Somebody who should have been born
is gone.
Just as the earth puckered its mouth,
each bud puffing out from its knot,
I changed my shoes, and then drove south.
Up past the Blue Mountains, where
Pennsylvania humps on endlessly,
wearing, like a crayoned cat, its green hair,
its roads sunken in like a gray washboard;
where, in truth, the ground cracks evilly,
a dark socket from which the coal has poured,

Somebody who should have been born
is gone.
the grass as bristly and stout as chives,
and me wondering when the ground would break,
and me wondering how anything fragile survives;
up in Pennsylvania, I met a little man,
not Rumpelstiltskin, at all, at all ...
he took the fullness that love began.
Returning north, even the sky grew thin
like a high window looking nowhere.
The road was as flat as a sheet of tin.

Somebody who should have been born
is gone.
Yes, woman, such logic will lead
to loss without death. Or say what you meant,
you coward ... this baby that I bleed.

Anne Sexton
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